DIVERGENSI CONTROL & CASH FLOW RIGHTS: MENGIDENTIFIKASI TRANSAKSI AFILIASI YANG BERSIFAT OPURTUNISTIK
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.33477/eksy.v4i01.3221Abstract
Abstrak:
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis hubungan divergensi pemisahan control right dan cash flow right dalam mekanisme kepemilikan piramida terhadap besaran transaksi afiliasi yang bersifat opurtunistik. Teknik analisis regresi digunakan untuk menguji hipotesis yang dikembangkan dalam penelitian, perusahaan manufakur yang terdaftar pada Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) selama 2014-2016 menjadi populasi dalam penelitian ini. Lebih lanjut teknik pengambilan sampel dilakukan menggunakan teknik random sampling. Hasil penelitian menunjukan terdapat motivasi yang kuat dari pemegang saham mayoritas untuk mengendalikan perusahaan melalui mekanisme divergensi control & cash flow rights dalam menentukan kebijakan dan arah perusahaan untuk kepentingan pribadi dengan memanfaatkan keuntungan dari transaksi afiliasi antar perusahaan.References
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